Understanding initiation behavior in Brazilian negotiations: an analysis of four regional subcultures

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ABSTRACT: Understanding and managing the negotiation process is fundamental to all aspects of organizational success. Frequently overlooked but essential to this process is the initiation stage of negotiation – engaging a counterpart, making a request or demand, and optimizing that request. The purpose of this paper is to examine the initiation process in an emerging economy (Brazil), focusing on variations across four prominent regional subcultures of that country – *Paulistas* (state of Sao Paulo), *Cariocas* (Rio de Janeiro), *Mineiros* (state of Minas Gerais), and *Gauchos* (state of Rio Grande do Sul). The results of this analysis suggest differences in the likelihood of initiation, and how that process might unfold. The implications of these conclusions for practitioners and future research are discussed.

Keywords: Negotiation, initiation behavior, Brazil, culture, subcultures.

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1. INTRODUCTION

Negotiation is an interpersonal decision-making process necessary whenever we cannot achieve our objectives single-handedly (Thompson, 2009). As such, negotiation is central to personal as well as organizational effectiveness and success (Lewicki, Barry & Saunders 2009; Mintzberg, 1973). Within and between organizations, and at all organizational levels, individuals negotiate on a daily basis – salaries, work schedules, product specifications, joint ventures, etc. (Greenhalgh, 2001).

Over the years, researchers have given considerable attention to the orientation of negotiators (e.g., cooperative vs. competitive) and the associated behaviors or tactics that these individuals employ (Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993; Shell, 1999; Thompson, 2009). Since negotiation experiments typically begin with the parties already at the bargaining table, far less attention has been given to the initiation stage of negotiation (Wheeler, 2004; Small, Gelfand, Babcock & Gettman, 2007).

More recently, however, researchers have begun to investigate the initiation process of negotiation, generally concluding that individuals often have difficulties engaging a counterpart and asking for what they want in a negotiation (Babcock & Laschever, 2003; Volkema, 2009). Negotiators often misjudge their counterparts' capabilities and intentions, further inhibiting the initiation process (Epley, Keysar, Van Boven & Gilovich, 2004). As a consequence of initiation reluctance, substantial benefits (money, goods, partnerships) can be "left on the table" for one or both parties, frequently with a corresponding loss of self-confidence if not respect (Babcock & Laschever, 2003; Babcock, Gelfand, Small & Stayn, 2006; Bowles, Babcock & Lai, 2007; Gerhart & Rynes, 1991; Rousseau, 2005).

With the dramatic growth and increasing interdependence of world economies over the past several decades, the challenges to initiating a negotiation have increased as well. Organizational representatives often find themselves negotiating with unfamiliar counterparts in new environments. Unfortunately, information on international negotiations is frequently limited to dos and don'ts, with countries treated as monoliths (Acuff, 2006; Gesteland, 1996; Morrison & Conaway, 2006). Yet countries such as China, Brazil, India, and Russia – among the most prominent emerging economies – are large and diverse with respect to languages, dialects, religions, regulations, customs, etc. This internal diversity,

characterized by subcultures, can easily be overlooked when preparing for a negotiation (Cheung & Chow, 1999; Lenartowicz, Johnson & White, 2003; Thelen, Ford & Honeycutt, 2006).

Brazil, a country that has recently emerged as an important player in trade and commerce, provides an example. Following the stabilization of its political and economic systems in the last decade of the twentieth century (Bandeira, 2006; Holland, 2010), Brazil has witness dramatic growth and increasing prominence. It has acquired some measure of energy independence while its middle class has begun to expand (Shankar, Ormiston, Bloch & Schaus, 2008; Soares, Ribas & Osório, 2010). Consequently, Brazil is now characterized by most as a regional power, with many viewing it as a potential power-broker on the world stage as well (de Cordoba & Luhnow, 2009).

Having recently been awarded the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Summer Olympics, the country's profile has been raised considerably. Organizations embarking on commercial negotiations in Brazil, however, need to recognize that the Brazilian culture is unique (not isomorphic to the cultures of other Central and South American countries) and multifaceted. That is, the country is comprised of distinct regions geographically, commercially, and culturally. Even in its southern cone, where most of the population and commerce are concentrated, important differences in attitude and style exist among the states (Lenartowicz & Roth, 2001). Negotiating effectively in Brazil requires an understanding of the nuances found in these subcultures, beginning with the initiation process.

The purpose of this paper is to understand the differential tendencies towards initiating negotiations for this emerging power, with particular focus on four major Brazilian subcultures – *Paulistas*, *Cariocas*, *Mineiros*, and *Gauchos*. The paper begins with an overview of the initiation process (engaging, requesting, optimizing), and then examines the negotiation process generally and the initiation process specifically within Brazil. Using five motivational domains with implications for initiation behavior – Achievement, Self-direction, Enjoyment, Security, and Restrictive Conformity – distinctions are drawn for these four regional subcultures. The implications of these findings for practitioners and future research are discussed.

UNDERSTANDING RELUCTANCE TO INITIATE

Models of the negotiation process frequently focus on exploring issues and managing concessions, with little attention given to initiating the process (Holmes,1992; Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993; Schuster & Copeland, 1996; Shell, 1999). However, as with many individual and organizational processes (problem-solving/decision-making: Nutt, 1992; group development: Bettenhausen, 1991), the early stages of the negotiation process are often important in determining the direction of succeeding stages (Adair, Taylor & Tinsley, 2009; Wheeler, 2004). What is the nature of the initiation process in negotiation, including the factors that are most likely to influence initiation behavior and outcome?

With negotiation, initiation refers to engaging another party for purposes of achieving a set of objectives. Failure to physically engage a counterpart will, in all likelihood, delay if not eliminate the possibility of achieving one's objectives. Physical engagement can be followed by an individual making a demand or request. While "asking" is not essential to accomplishing one's objectives (sometimes a counterpart will take the lead following engagement), the likelihood of accomplishment is probably greater when a request is made. The outcome of that request can fulfill one's objectives in total or in part, depending on the nature of the request. For example, a negotiator might prefer same-day delivery on a product, but request delivery within three days (a sub-optimized request) out of fear that an optimized request would be denied and/or other issues introduced (e.g., a re-negotiation of the price).

The theory of planned behavior provides a framework for understanding the factors that will determine the elements of initiation behavior – engaging, requesting, and optimizing (Figure 1). The theory of planned behavior offers a model of reasoned action that connects attitudes to intentions, and intentions to behavior (cf. Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; Kim & Hunter, 1993). As pertains to initiation, attitudes include those individual or personal characteristics that are related to engaging and asking. Specifically, these include: a) the individual's belief in the appropriateness of engaging in specific initiation behavior and b) the individual's confidence in his/her ability to achieve certain goals when acting on his or her interests (Bandura, 2001; Huppertz, 2003). The former – perceived propriety/appropriateness of initiating a request – is determined by the culture or socialization of an individual (Adair & Brett, 2005; Volkema, 2009), while the latter – confidence in being able to achieve certain goals (i.e., self-efficacy) – is based primarily on past successes in personal and vicarious negotiations (Cho & Lee, 2006). Thus, an

individual who believes it is appropriate to initiate a negotiation (e.g., engage, request, optimize) and who also believes that he/she has the ability to succeed in that act is more likely to initiate a negotiation than someone with the opposite characteristics.


Figure 1. Model of Negotiation Engagement/Initiation

Since negotiations take place within a context, situational factors can affect the initiation process as well. These factors include one's clarity of purpose, the importance of the negotiation/outcome, available alternatives, perceived time constraints, one's role definition (e.g., buyer, seller), the venue or setting (familiar or unfamiliar, favorable or unfavorable), and one's counterpart (Bowles, et al., 2007; Brett, Pinkley & Jackorsky, 1996; Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959; Pinkley, Neale & Bennett, 1994). Situational factors influence the relationship between an individual's attitude/personality and his/her intentions to initiate a negotiation, as well as the dynamic process between the formation of intentions and behaviors (i.e., as new information becomes available, such as a counterpart's demeanor). In general, the situational factors of many international negotiations will inhibit initiating behavior, because they are likely to include an unfamiliar environment, a counterpart with presumed negotiating skills, a role suggesting less power or leverage (e.g., buyer/initiator), and a multitude of alternatives available in a global marketplace (Volkema, 2006).

Personal characteristics and situational factors also differ in that the former is more likely associated with a chronic reluctance to initiate a negotiation while the latter is more likely to be associated with episodic reluctance. Thus, to understand and manage chronic

reluctance (personal characteristics) requires an appreciation for the culture or socialization of an individual. In the following section, the cultural characteristics of Brazilian negotiators are discussed, including the affect of these characteristics on initiation behavior; the succeeding section focuses on initiation behavior for four prominent regional subcultures within Brazil.

BRAZILIAN NEGOTIATORS

Over the past three decades, Brazilians have witnessed a number of significant political and economic changes in their country, including a return to democratically-elected governments after years of military rule, the taming of hyperinflation and stabilization of their currency, the privatization of many state-owned industries, the elimination of their foreign debt, and the transformation of a regional economy into a global economic leader. Now included in the same breath as the major emerging markets of Russia, India, and China, Brazil has developed a diverse portfolio of exports (e.g., aircraft, automobiles, ethanol, iron ore, foot ware, orange juice, soybeans) and an expanding presence in international financial and commodities markets (Brainard & Martinez-Diaz, 2009; Roett, 2010).

Throughout these changes, however, Brazilians have continued to maintain a number of cultural characteristics which differentiate Brazilian negotiators from North American and Northwestern European negotiators in particular. To effectively conduct business with the "new" Brazil, these norms, customs, and behaviors must be understood and managed. Broadly speaking, these characteristics fall into three categories – task vs. relational orientation, behaviors/tactics (e.g., time, space, logic), and agreements (e.g., formality, specificity).

First and foremost, Brazilian negotiators like to spend extended time getting acquainted (or re-acquainted) in most business situations. While negotiators from the United States, for example, are generally quick to get down to business, Brazilian negotiators prefer to spend considerably more social time up front, sharing food and drink, stories, backgrounds, gifts, etc. (Morrison & Conaway, 2006).

Given the importance placed on relationships, it should not be surprising that Brazilians typically offer more eye contact and are more physically engaging than individuals from North America and Northwestern Europe (Graham, 1985). Their appreciation for time, which is much more relaxed and flexible, is determined in part by relational concerns: Meeting time is expanded based on the nature and demands of the

relationship, rather than constrained by a pre-determined schedule. Also, partly due to the importance placed on relationships, Brazilians often are more indirect in giving feedback or making their points. And comparatively speaking, they can to be more emotional in making their arguments in a negotiation (Acuff, 2006; Volkema, 1999).

To some extent, cultural variations can be traced to differences in Brazilian colonization versus the colonization of North America. In the United States, for example, the thirteen original colonies sought independence from one another as much as from the motherland (e.g., England); self-governance was central to their existence. In contrast, Portugal and Spain sought to create a dependent relationship with the countries that they colonized, including Brazil. To a large extent, this was to take advantage of the natural resources discovered in Brazil, which were harvested for the benefit of the colonial powers. This created a hierarchical relationship, which remains embedded in Brazilian culture, as characterized by the centralized decision making found in many Brazilian organizations (Volkema & Chang, 1998).

Finally, there are differences in terms of agreements. Unlike North American and Northwestern European negotiators, who typically favor written contracts with considerable detail and specificity, agreements in Brazil are often less precise or even unwritten. As such, recording agreements is viewed more as a symbolic act than as creating a definitive statement or blueprint. Instead of a piece of paper legally binding the parties to an agreement, it is the relationship forged by the principal negotiators from strategic positions in the organizational hierarchy that will allow unanticipated circumstances and other emerging problems to be managed (Acuff, 2006; Morrison & Conaway, 2006).

In terms of initiation behavior, Brazil also is unique. Volkema (2012) estimated the probability of initiating a negotiation for ten countries – Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Germany, India, Japan, Mexico, the United Kingdom, and the United States – based on data from Hofstede's (1997, 2001) seminal work on country cultures and VanEverdingen and Waarts' (2003) data on cultural context and time management. He determined that the likelihood of initiation in Brazil was greater than that for China and Japan but considerably less than found in Germany, the United States, and the United Kingdom.

Qualitatively, the hierarchical nature of Brazilian culture suggests a likelihood of hesitation when initiating with someone at a higher organizational or social level, but far more confidence when the negotiator is in a position of power relative to his/her counterpart (Brass & Burkhardt, 1993). The importance of building relationships   means

that Brazilians may be more inclined to be assertive with out-group members (strangers with whom they share few similarities) than in-group members, using a system of networked entry to increase the likelihood of success (Gudykunst, 2003; Kim & Shapiro, 2008; Triandis, 1988). Compared to a negotiator from the United States, for example, a Brazilian's approach would probably be more indirect and, should the request be met with resistance, more emotional (Adair, Okumura & Brett, 2001; Adair, et al., 2007; Volkema & Chang, 1998).

These are, of course, generalizations to which there are always exceptions. The exceptions can be caused by situational factors, such as those described above (time constraints, venue, counterpart) as well as the degree of self-efficacy possessed by a negotiator. They also can be the result of variations found in the culture of the country, which can influence an individual's perceived appropriateness of initiating a negotiation. In Brazil, there are four prominent regional subcultures located in the southern cone of the country, each of which suggests some variation on the initiation process. These four subcultures are discussed below.

INITIATION BEHAVIOR IN FOUR REGIONAL SUBCULTURES

Brazil is a large country geographically (larger than the continental United States), with considerable racial and ethnic diversity as a consequence of its indigenous populations, European colonization, and history of immigration. Even in the southern part of the country, where the vast majority of Brazil's largest companies are located and where approximately seventy percent of the population resides, substantial diversity can be found. The most prominent regional subcultures in southern Brazil include: *Cariocas*, from Rio de Janeiro, *Paulistas*, from the state of Sao Paulo, *Mineiros*, from the state of Minas Gerais, and *Gauchos*, from the state of Rio Grande do Sul. The differences across these four regions have implications for negotiating generally, and the initiation process more specifically (Lenartowicz & Roth, 2001).

The city of Rio de Janeiro is perhaps best known for its mountainous landscape and popular beaches (e.g., Copacabana, Ipanema). At one time the site of the nation's capital, it remains the home of many companies that were once entirely state owned (e.g., the oil company *Petrobras*), as well as the entertainment center for the country (e.g., home to the media conglomerate *Globo*). Today, service centers dominate the Rio economy, including tourism and banking.   Perhaps in part because of its attractive landscape and economic

focus, the typical *Carioca* is described as relaxed, playful, helpful, energetic, flexible, indolent, and irreverent (Bastide, 1964; Momsen, 1968; Smith, 1972; Vincent, 2003).

In contrast, the state of Sao Paulo is the industrial and economic engine of Brazil, responsible for approximately half of Brazil's gross domestic product. Its capital, Sao Paulo, is the largest city in South America. The economy of the state of Sao Paulo supports a full range of industries, including automotive, aviation, textiles, machinery, and agriculture. The state is comprised of a mix of immigrants from Europe (predominantly Italy), Asia (the largest Japanese population outside of Japan), and the Middle-East, along with South American natives and Africans.

There is a friendly and natural competition between *Paulistas* and *Cariocas*, as their major cities are not only the two largest in the country but less than three hundred miles apart. Despite the proximity, the cities and the states have quite different geographies and rhythms. While *Cariocas* have been described as relaxed and playful, *Paulistas* are often characterized as restless, work-centered, erudite, formal, action-oriented, and tenacious (Bastide, 1964; Freyre, 1959; Smith, 1972; Vincent, 2003).

Minas Gerais is the second most populous state and the second richest state in Brazil. It is also a state of considerable geographic diversity, known for its agriculture and mining. The latter played an important role in the colonial history of the country, as gold was discovered in the late seventeenth century, followed by the discovery of diamonds and other gems. The capital of the state, Belo Horizonte, is the third largest metropolitan area in the country. The people of Minas Gerais – *Mineiros* – are generally considered reserved, austere, prudent, modest, introverted, cautious, mistrustful, and tolerant (Bastide, 1964; Smith, 1972; Vincent, 2003).

Finally, Rio Grande do Sul is the southern-most state in Brazil, bordered by Uruguay and Argentina. In some ways it reflects the intersection of peoples from the region bordering these countries (the Pampas) and the European immigrants from Portugal, Spain, Germany, and Italy. The area is known for its grain production, wineries, and ranching. Porto Alegre is the capital and largest city in the state. Culturally, the *Gauchos* are described as individualistic, authoritarian, opportunistic, courteous, and extroverted (Bastide, 1964; Momsen, 1968; Smith, 1972).

Given these distinct qualities, what differences might one expect in the negotiation styles of individuals from each of these four subcultures? More specifically, what differences would one expect in the likelihood of an individual initiating a negotiation,

including engaging a counterpart, making a request or demand, and optimizing that request?

Lenartowicz and Roth (2001) sought to determine measurable differences among these four regional subcultures, using a variation of Schwartz and Bilsky's (1987, 1990) theory of the universal structure of values. [1] Of the various motivational domains identified by Schwartz and Bilsky, Lenartowicz and Roth collected data on five domains that they believed to be pertinent to management and business performance – Achievement, Self-direction, Enjoyment, Security, and Restrictive Conformity. Each of these domains has implications for the initiation process as well.

Achievement refers to one's drive for personal success through demonstrated competence. We might expect individuals with a high motivation for achievement to have a correspondingly high probability of initiating a negotiation, since initiation is generally a key to achieving one's objectives when an interpersonal approach is needed (Thompson, 2009). This would certainly include engaging and requesting, if not optimizing one's request.

The second domain, Self-direction, refers to the need for independent thought, creativity, and action, along with the belief that such actions will enable an individual to control his/her environment and outcomes. Again, we might expect a positive, direct relationship between this domain and initiation behavior. An individual with a desire for control would not only be likely to engage and ask a negotiating counterpart, but also to optimize his/her demand or request as well.

Enjoyment, the third domain, refers to a desire for pleasure, a comfortable life, and happiness. Since negotiation is based on a felt need that, in the mind of the initiator, can best be satisfied through engaging another party, it might be expected that a desire for pleasure, comfort, and happiness would promote initiation. This would include not only engaging a prospective counterpart, but making a request and optimizing that request.

Security, the fourth domain, is related to risk propensity, with an individual preferring a high level of safety, harmony, and stability seeking to avoid uncertainty (risk). Prior research on initiation behavior suggests that individuals willing to take risks are more likely to be assertive (Fu, et al., 2004; Liu, Furrer & Sudharshan, 2001). Therefore, we might expect an inverse relationship between Security and initiation behavior, with a corresponding reluctance to optimize a request (as it increases the chance of failure), to make a request, and even to engage a counterpart at times.

Finally, Restrictive Conformity refers to restraint in one's desires and actions if these are likely to violate social norms or harm others. Individuals from cultures high in Restrictive Conformity prefer to promote collective rather than individual needs, and consequently this motivational domain would be inversely related to initiation behavior as well. The greater the Restrictive Conformity, the less likely the individual would be to engage a counterpart. Where engagement is inescapable, requesting would not be initiated.

Using the Rokeach Values Survey to measure motivational domains (Kamakura & Mazzon, 1991; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987; 1990), Lenartowicz and Roth collected a sample of 189 usable responses across the four regions: *Paulistas* (n=62), *Carioca*s (n=49), *Mineiros* (n=31), and *Gauchos* (n=47). The normalized (0-100 scale) mean values for those sub-samples are shown in Table 1. [2]

TABLE 1: MOTIVATIONAL DOMAINS AND PROPENSITY TO INITIATE NEGOTIATIONS FOR FOUR REGIONAL SUBCULTURES IN BRAZIL [a]

Regional Subculture	Motivational Domains [b]					Propensity to Initiate [c]
	Achievement	Self-direction	Enjoyment	Security	Restrictive Conformity	
Gauchos	75.9	67.0	76.7	88.3	55.4	79.6
Paulistas	69.3	67.0	77.0	78.7	62.3	72.9
Cariocas	68.8	58.7	77.4	88.7	56.0	62.9
Mineiros	63.9	56.6	68.2	81.6	52.8	57.3

[a] Normalized values (0-100 scale) for each motivational domain. Propensity to Initiate also is on a 0-100 scale.
[b] Original values for the five motivational domains can be found in Lenartowicz and Roth (2001).
[c] The index for Propensity to Initiate a negotiation was calculated as the product of the three motivational domains proposed to positively influence propensity to initiate (Achievement, Self-direction, Enjoyment), divided by the product of the two motivational domains proposed to negatively (inversely) influence propensity to initiate (Security, Restrictive Conformity).

Gauchos had the highest score for Achievement, consistent with their individualistic orientation (Gelfand & Christakopoulou, 1999; Liu, et al., 2001). *Gauchos* were tied with *Paulistas* for the highest score for Self-direction. *Cariocas* had the highest score for Enjoyment. *Paulistas* had the lowest score for Security (the lower the value, the more likely to initiate), suggesting a willingness to take risks. *Mineiros* had the lowest score for Restrictive Conformity (again, the lower the value, the greater the likelihood of initiating a negotiation), while *Paulistas* had the highest score (perhaps a consequence of the large Japanese population in Sao Paulo and their likely emphasis on collectivism) (Acuff, 2006).

When the values for these five motivational domains were combined (dividing the product of the directly related values – Achievement, Self-direction, and Enjoyment – by the product of the inversely related values – Security and Restrictive Conformity), *Gauchos* had the highest initiation index (79.6), followed by *Paulistas* (72.9), *Cariocas* (62.9), and *Mineiros* (57.3). Based on these indices and the descriptions offered earlier for these four regional subcultures, we might have expected *Gauchos* and *Paulistas* to be the most inclined towards initiating negotiations.

In terms of the specific phases of the initiation process – engage, request, optimize – the high scores for *Gauchos* relative to the other subcultures for Achievement and Self-direction (control through action) suggest that *Gauchos* are likely to have less inhibitions engaging a potential counterpart in a negotiation, an action consistent with their individualistic, authoritarian, opportunistic, and extroverted reputation. With scores nearly as high, *Paulistas* also would appear to be more motivated when it comes to engaging a counterpart, which is consistent with their action-oriented reputation. On the other hand, *Mineiros* scored the lowest with respect to Achievement, Self-direction, and Enjoyment, suggesting the least likelihood of engaging counterparts. These results correspond to the previously-mentioned descriptors of *Mineiros* – introverted, reserved, prudent, cautious, and mistrustful.

In terms of asking (requesting) and optimizing, the low Security score for *Paulistas* (lowest of the four subcultures) indicates a willingness to take risks, including most probably through asking for what they want or desire. This is consistent with their reputations for being tenacious. *Cariocas*, in contrast, had the highest score for Security, suggesting that they might be less assertive when it comes to asking for what they want. This is not inconsistent with their reputations for being relaxed and flexible.

MANAGING THE INITIATION PROCESS

Information is perhaps the most important element in negotiation (Cohen, 1980; Lewicki, et al., 2009). The more information an individual has about his or her counterpart (e.g., how to help or hurt a counterpart, the counterpart's style), the better off that individual generally will be in a negotiation (Brodt, 1994; Volkema, 1999). Therefore, one of the first and most important steps in negotiation, including and especially international negotiations, is to understand one's own style and that of his or her counterpart(s).

In a negotiation involving an international counterpart, it is easy to be trapped by one's innate cognitive biases and misperceptions. That is, it is not uncommon for a

negotiator to assume that a counterpart (e.g., a Brazilian counterpart) shares his or her frame of reference, values, or style (Epley, et al., 2004) or that all Latin Americans negotiate the same (as there are a number of similarities shared by these countries) (Schuster & Copeland, 1996) or that all Brazilians share a singular style of negotiating (Acuff, 2006). Should an individual happen to undertake negotiations in Rio de Janeiro, for example, before Sao Paulo, he/she might be surprised to find that the more relaxed and playful attitude found in the former is not as prevalent in the latter. If the experiences were reversed, the negotiator might be surprised that his or her counterpart in Rio de Janeiro is not as action-oriented and tenacious as those he/she encountered in Sao Paulo. It is easy to imagine how confusion could lead to suspicion and distrust, ultimately resulting in an impasse.

According to Weiss (1994), the availability of stylistic knowledge suggests several ways in which cross-cultural negotiations can be managed. These include: inducing the other party to follow one's cultural preferences, adapting one's style in whole or in part to the other party's culture, employing a professional third party (agent, mediator) to help you work through the issues, or improvising an approach (i.e., employing an approach that requires both or all parties to make compromises). The approach that works best will depend on a number of factors, including how well the parties know each other's culture or subculture.

The choice of approach might also depend on who has more power or leverage. The leverage/advantage that one party has over another party is a function of perceived wants or needs (demand) and alternatives (supply) (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005; Emerson, 1962; Kim, Pinkley & Fragale, 2005). (These sources of power or leverage are represented by the first three situational factors shown in Figure 1.) The more resource dependent a party is on his/her counterpart, the more leverage the counterpart is likely to have.

There are a number of ways that power or advantage in a negotiation might be signaled, including when the party with the resource dependence (i.e., lack of power) feels compelled to travel to his/her counterpart's office, city, or country (Volkema, 2006). Thus, a business person traveling to Sao Paulo to undertake a negotiation is quite likely signaling that the *Paulista* has something of interest (strong demand) for which there may not be an adequate alternative (short supply). In situations such as this, it is likely that the *Paulista* would expect the visiting party to adapt to his or her style. Under such circumstances, knowing the nuances of that style would be valuable.

Likewise, if the advantage was reversed (i.e., the *Paulista* had a greater perceived need and fewer alternatives) and he/she was compelled to travel to a counterpart's country, it would be valuable for the counterpart to recognize the regional subculture of the *Paulista* and its implications for initiation behavior. To get a response, the counterpart's invitation to visit might require more repetition or reinforcement for one Brazilian subculture than for another subculture. Further, the counterpart might have to manage the dialogue differently (e.g., leading questions, increased directness), depending on the subculture.

FINAL THOUGHTS

The emergence of world markets over the past two decades has increased the challenges of negotiating effectively and efficiently. While a number of scholars and practitioners have offered insights into cultural distinctions, these articles and books have generally been restricted to a national level of analysis (cf. Acuff, 2006; Morrison & Conaway, 2006). For large and diverse countries, such as France, Canada, the United States, China, and Brazil, there are regional nuances that also must be understood and managed to negotiate most effectively (Cheung & Chow, 1999; Lenartowicz & Roth, 2001).

Getting off on the right foot is important in negotiations, particularly international negotiations. The early stages often set the tone and direction for what follows (Adair, et al., 2009; Wheeler, 2004). At the same time, there are some cultures where individuals are recognized as more assertive in initiating a negotiation than is the case in other cultures (Volkema, 2012). This paper sought to look beyond national boundaries and to identify initiation differences among four regional subcultures in Brazil, an emerging economy now mentioned in the same breath with China, Russia, and India. That is, this paper sought to understand regional differences in propensity to engage another party, to make a request or demand, and to optimize that request.

Employing five motivational domains with implications for initiation behavior (Lenartowicz & Roth, 2001), four prominent Brazilian subcultures were analyzed. The results suggest some important distinctions. *Gauchos* and *Paulistas* were found to have the greatest likelihood of initiating negotiations, followed by *Cariocas* and *Mineiros*. It was suggested that *Gauchos* and *Paulistas*, due to their relatively high scores for Achievement and Self-direction, would be more inclined to engage a counterpart. Once engaged, *Paulistas* would be most comfortable asking for what they want/need, while *Cariocas* would be least comfortable in asking.

The application of these findings, however, goes beyond what happens during a first encounter. Negotiations frequently consist of not one but many separate or interlocking negotiations. For example, a complex business negotiation could take place over weeks or months, and consist of a series of negotiations involving when and where to meet, who will attend, what data to bring, the issues, positions on the issues, etc. And once an agreement is reached, adaptations (re-negotiations) are likely during implementation. Each of these can involve a decision about "asking," as well as whether or not to optimize one's request. Thus, we may find some of these regional "instincts" appearing throughout the business negotiation cycle.

As always, the analysis presented in this paper must be viewed within context, suggesting some cautions in terms of interpretation and generalization. First, we chose to analyze the data for five motivational domains – Achievement, Self-direction, Enjoyment, Security, and Restrictive Conformity. While the likely relationship between each domain and initiation behavior was logically argued, no attempt was made to differentiate the degree of contribution of each domain to the probability of initiation. That is, the five domains were weighted equally. It might be worthwhile for future researchers to measure the unique contributions of each domain, with specific applications to engaging, requesting, and optimizing.

Also, there may be other variables, independent from these five domains, which could also be correlated with initiation behavior. These include Hofstede's cultural dimensions, the variables examined by House, et al. (2004), cultural context (Hall, 1976), and time management (Gesteland, 1996). Future research might seek to identify their contributions to understanding the likelihood of engaging, requesting, and optimizing as well.

Like Hofstede's (1997, 2001) study, which consisted of participants from a single company (IBM), Lenartowicz and Roth (2001) sampled a single industry – owner-operated kiosk businesses. Choosing a single line of business to sample in a study helps control for a number of factors, including the potential effects of ownership type, organizational culture, and organization-specific characteristics on performance. Nonetheless, it might be worthwhile replicating data collection with another sample.

As noted, there are a number of approaches that a negotiator can take when confronted with a counterpart from another culture (Weiss, 1994). Understanding the other party's culture (including subtleties found in subcultures) as well as one's own cultural tendencies can help in that process.   With the continued emergence of markets in Brazil,

Russia, India, China, and elsewhere, the importance of making these distinctions can contribute to an individual's competitive advantage throughout a negotiation, but particularly with the critical initiation process.

ENDNOTES

[1] Schwartz (1992, 2007) has subsequently added some other dimensions to his motivational domains (values). However, the five domains used in this analysis have remained in this expanded set of values.
[2] To illustrate how normalized values and Propensity to Initiate were derived, Lenartowicz and Roth (2001) found the mean value for Achievement for *Gauchos* to be 7.83, on a ten-point scale from one to ten. The normalized (0-100 scale) equivalent is 75.9: ((7.83-1) x 100)/(10-1). In general, the normalized value is the mean value minus the minimum value possible times 100, divided by the maximum value possible minus the minimum value possible. To calculate Propensity to Initiate for a particular subculture, the normalized values for the positively related domains – Achievement, Self-direction, and Enjoyment – were multiplied together, and this product was divided by the product of the negatively (inversely) related domains – Security and Restrictive Conformity. For *Gauchos*, this was: (75.9 x 67.0 x 76.7) / (88.3 x 55.4) = 79.6.

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